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Jun 16 15 6:38 AM
Two Years On, How Much Has Edward Snowden Achieved?
Friday June 5 marked the second anniversary of the start of Edward Snowden’s disclosures. The days preceding this anniversary highlighted Snowden’s continued prominence. On June 1, Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act—the legal basis for the domestic telephone metadata surveillance program Snowden revealed—expired. On June 2, the Senate passed and President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act, which the House of Representatives previously approved. This legislation transforms how the U.S. government will access domestic telephone metadata for foreign surveillance. On June 4, the New York Times published a story based on Snowden-disclosed documents claiming the NSA secretly expanded “Internet spying at the U.S. border.” Also on June 4, Snowden published an op-ed claiming that “the world says no to surveillance.” It was a good week for Snowden. But has it been a good two years for the rest of us? Section 215 and the Domestic Telephone Metadata Program Snowden’s signature achievement involved exposing what the U.S. government did under a secret interpretation of Section 215. He defended the principle that the government should not exercise power under secret laws. Although oversight bodies found no NSA abuses, this conclusion did not overcome the rule-of-law defect Snowden emphasized. However, Snowden’s challenge was not the only factor in Section 215’s death. The metadata program was ineffective as a counter-terrorism tool, which led some in the intelligence community to welcome its demise. Had the program contributed to foiling terrorism, its utility might have overcome the taint of its secret jurisprudence. Section 702 Surveillance Against Foreign Targets Snowden also exposed programs operated under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). For example, the Times article on June 4 used Snowden-provided documents to disclose that the U.S. government began conducting surveillance for malicious cyber activities suspected to originate from foreign governments. Section 702 authorizes surveillance against foreign governments, so the cyber surveillance fits within this legal authority.
Friday June 5 marked the second anniversary of the start of Edward Snowden’s disclosures. The days preceding this anniversary highlighted Snowden’s continued prominence.
On June 1, Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act—the legal basis for the domestic telephone metadata surveillance program Snowden revealed—expired. On June 2, the Senate passed and President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act, which the House of Representatives previously approved. This legislation transforms how the U.S. government will access domestic telephone metadata for foreign surveillance.
On June 4, the New York Times published a story based on Snowden-disclosed documents claiming the NSA secretly expanded “Internet spying at the U.S. border.” Also on June 4, Snowden published an op-ed claiming that “the world says no to surveillance.”
It was a good week for Snowden. But has it been a good two years for the rest of us?
Section 215 and the Domestic Telephone Metadata Program
Snowden’s signature achievement involved exposing what the U.S. government did under a secret interpretation of Section 215. He defended the principle that the government should not exercise power under secret laws. Although oversight bodies found no NSA abuses, this conclusion did not overcome the rule-of-law defect Snowden emphasized.
However, Snowden’s challenge was not the only factor in Section 215’s death. The metadata program was ineffective as a counter-terrorism tool, which led some in the intelligence community to welcome its demise. Had the program contributed to foiling terrorism, its utility might have overcome the taint of its secret jurisprudence.
Section 702 Surveillance Against Foreign Targets
Snowden also exposed programs operated under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). For example, the Times article on June 4 used Snowden-provided documents to disclose that the U.S. government began conducting surveillance for malicious cyber activities suspected to originate from foreign governments. Section 702 authorizes surveillance against foreign governments, so the cyber surveillance fits within this legal authority.
Read more @ http://www.newsweek.com/two-years-how-much-has-edward-snowden-achieved-340906
The collection of Australia’s personal information under the government’s new metadata laws will create a “high risk” target for cyber attacks as the value of data for criminal groups skyrockets. The former head of the US intelligence probe into the Edward Snowden leaks, Keith Lowry, has also told The Australian that the government and corporations needed to be particularly vigilant against the risk of an “insider” attack amid an epidemic of data theft. Warning that cyber crime was more profitable than global cocaine and heroin trades combined, Mr Lowry said a recent study by IBM had found more than half of all cyber attacks occurred with help from insiders or “malicious” participants. He has also warned that insiders are likely involved in assisting foreign spies of corporate and government interests either for personal financial gain or as unwitting helpers. “If you look at the profits, the revenues, from the illegal activities from cyber-security attacks, it is more than cocaine, heroin and other illegal drugs combined and it is a much easier thing to do with a much less penalty,” he said. “Transnational criminal organisations recognise that it is an important revenue stream for them; non-state actors realise it is an easy way, and I believe that state actors are also doing the exact same thing.”
The collection of Australia’s personal information under the government’s new metadata laws will create a “high risk” target for cyber attacks as the value of data for criminal groups skyrockets.
The former head of the US intelligence probe into the Edward Snowden leaks, Keith Lowry, has also told The Australian that the government and corporations needed to be particularly vigilant against the risk of an “insider” attack amid an epidemic of data theft.
Warning that cyber crime was more profitable than global cocaine and heroin trades combined, Mr Lowry said a recent study by IBM had found more than half of all cyber attacks occurred with help from insiders or “malicious” participants.
He has also warned that insiders are likely involved in assisting foreign spies of corporate and government interests either for personal financial gain or as unwitting helpers.
“If you look at the profits, the revenues, from the illegal activities from cyber-security attacks, it is more than cocaine, heroin and other illegal drugs combined and it is a much easier thing to do with a much less penalty,” he said.
“Transnational criminal organisations recognise that it is an important revenue stream for them; non-state actors realise it is an easy way, and I believe that state actors are also doing the exact same thing.”
Read more @ http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/metadata-easy-prey-for-cyber-thieves-keith-lowry/story-fnpdbcmu-1227399340204
MOSCOW — TWO years ago today, three journalists and I worked nervously in a Hong Kong hotel room, waiting to see how the world would react to the revelation that the National Security Agency had been making records of nearly every phone call in the United States. In the days that followed, those journalists and others published documents revealing that democratic governments had been monitoring the private activities of ordinary citizens who had done nothing wrong. Within days, the United States government responded by bringing charges against me under World War I-era espionage laws. The journalists were advised by lawyers that they risked arrest or subpoena if they returned to the United States. Politicians raced to condemn our efforts as un-American, even treasonous. Privately, there were moments when I worried that we might have put our privileged lives at risk for nothing — that the public would react with indifference, or practiced cynicism, to the revelations. Never have I been so grateful to have been so wrong. Two years on, the difference is profound. In a single month, the N.S.A.’s invasive call-tracking program was declared unlawful by the courts and disowned by Congress. After a White House-appointed oversight board investigation found that this program had not stopped a single terrorist attack, even the president who once defended its propriety and criticized its disclosure has now ordered it terminated. This is the power of an informed public.
MOSCOW — TWO years ago today, three journalists and I worked nervously in a Hong Kong hotel room, waiting to see how the world would react to the revelation that the National Security Agency had been making records of nearly every phone call in the United States. In the days that followed, those journalists and others published documents revealing that democratic governments had been monitoring the private activities of ordinary citizens who had done nothing wrong.
Within days, the United States government responded by bringing charges against me under World War I-era espionage laws. The journalists were advised by lawyers that they risked arrest or subpoena if they returned to the United States. Politicians raced to condemn our efforts as un-American, even treasonous.
Privately, there were moments when I worried that we might have put our privileged lives at risk for nothing — that the public would react with indifference, or practiced cynicism, to the revelations.
Never have I been so grateful to have been so wrong.
Two years on, the difference is profound. In a single month, the N.S.A.’s invasive call-tracking program was declared unlawful by the courts and disowned by Congress. After a White House-appointed oversight board investigation found that this program had not stopped a single terrorist attack, even the president who once defended its propriety and criticized its disclosure has now ordered it terminated.
This is the power of an informed public.
Read more @ http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/opinion/edward-snowden-the-world-says-no-to-surveillance.html?_r=0
Whistleblower says ‘profound difference’ has occurred over past two years after leaking of NSA documents as public demands privacy A “profound difference” has occurred over the past two years, following the leaking of NSA documents that led to revelations about US surveillance on phone and internet communications, whistleblower Edward Snowden has said. Writing in the New York Times, the computer analyst said that the balance of power is changing as a post-terror generation “turns away from reaction and fear in favour of resilience and reason”. Snowden said that bulk data collection programmes had been declared illegal and disavowed by the US Congress. “After a White House-appointed oversight board investigation found that this program had not stopped a single terrorist attack, even the president who once defended its propriety and criticised its disclosure has now ordered it terminated,” he said in the piece, also published in the French newspaper Liberation.
Whistleblower says ‘profound difference’ has occurred over past two years after leaking of NSA documents as public demands privacy
A “profound difference” has occurred over the past two years, following the leaking of NSA documents that led to revelations about US surveillance on phone and internet communications, whistleblower Edward Snowden has said.
Writing in the New York Times, the computer analyst said that the balance of power is changing as a post-terror generation “turns away from reaction and fear in favour of resilience and reason”.
Snowden said that bulk data collection programmes had been declared illegal and disavowed by the US Congress.
“After a White House-appointed oversight board investigation found that this program had not stopped a single terrorist attack, even the president who once defended its propriety and criticised its disclosure has now ordered it terminated,” he said in the piece, also published in the French newspaper Liberation.
Read more @ http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/05/snowden-balance-power-shifted-people-defy-government-surveillance-nsa
The spy agency is neither reformed nor toothless. But there is something that we should be talking about. The spy agency is neither reformed nor toothless. But there is something that we should be talking about. One week after Congress voted to stop the National Security Agency from collecting and storing millions of Americans’ phone records, partisans on both sides are exaggerating the significance of this new reform. NSA supporters lament the loss of a key tool for fighting terrorists, while the agency’s critics hail the new law as (in Edward Snowden’s words) an “historic victory for the rights of every citizen,” with some calling its passage a vindication of Snowden himself as an authentic whistleblower who should be let back home as a hero, not a convict.
Read more @ http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2015/06/the_national_security_agency_s_surveillance_and_the_usa_freedom_act_the.html
I don’t believe this article…..
According to the Sunday Times, Britain has been compelled to pull out agents from live operations in certain countries after Russia and China were able to crack top secret information within the files leaked by ex-U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. Charged with espionage, the 31-year Snowden fled to Moscow to seek protection with help from Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2013. According to the paper, MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service that works overseas, has removed agents from certain “hostile” countries.
According to the Sunday Times, Britain has been compelled to pull out agents from live operations in certain countries after Russia and China were able to crack top secret information within the files leaked by ex-U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.
Charged with espionage, the 31-year Snowden fled to Moscow to seek protection with help from Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2013.
According to the paper, MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service that works overseas, has removed agents from certain “hostile” countries.
Read more @ http://www.latinpost.com/articles/59768/20150615/britain-pulls-m16-spies-out-hostile-countries-russia-china-crack.htm
For a few days, there was a happily yawning gap in the U.S. National Security Agency’s ability to surveil American citizens. Congress could not agree on how – or whether – to renew the section of the foolishly named Patriot Act that had allowed the government to scoop up and hold all the metadata (identifying both callers and addressees) of all cellphone calls in the U.S. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would then grant or, at least sometimes, not grant, access to the actual contents of the conversations – in other words, a search warrant. The upshot – under the new U.S.A. Freedom Act (officially, the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015”) – is that phone companies, not the NSA and the FBI, will record and store all the metadata for all phone calls. Those agencies will no longer be able to get at that kind of data at will, indiscriminately. The security agencies will have to apply to the FISC court for metadata, too. That’s progress, though FISC may be a bit of a rubber stamp. There is, by the way, no sign that terrorists attacked the United States in the unsurveilled interval between the Patriot Act section and the Freedom Act. What about Canada? Our Communications Security Establishment – the equivalent of the NSA – never vacuumed up all Canadian metadata. However, Edward Snowden’s revelations have provided strong evidence that CSE agents go or have gone on fishing expeditions, specifically in Canadian airports, randomly looking for all sorts of communications metadata. It’s a more selective approach than American trawling in “bulk telephony collection,” but really just different in scale, not in kind.
For a few days, there was a happily yawning gap in the U.S. National Security Agency’s ability to surveil American citizens. Congress could not agree on how – or whether – to renew the section of the foolishly named Patriot Act that had allowed the government to scoop up and hold all the metadata (identifying both callers and addressees) of all cellphone calls in the U.S. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would then grant or, at least sometimes, not grant, access to the actual contents of the conversations – in other words, a search warrant.
The upshot – under the new U.S.A. Freedom Act (officially, the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015”) – is that phone companies, not the NSA and the FBI, will record and store all the metadata for all phone calls. Those agencies will no longer be able to get at that kind of data at will, indiscriminately. The security agencies will have to apply to the FISC court for metadata, too. That’s progress, though FISC may be a bit of a rubber stamp.
There is, by the way, no sign that terrorists attacked the United States in the unsurveilled interval between the Patriot Act section and the Freedom Act.
What about Canada? Our Communications Security Establishment – the equivalent of the NSA – never vacuumed up all Canadian metadata. However, Edward Snowden’s revelations have provided strong evidence that CSE agents go or have gone on fishing expeditions, specifically in Canadian airports, randomly looking for all sorts of communications metadata. It’s a more selective approach than American trawling in “bulk telephony collection,” but really just different in scale, not in kind.
Read more @ http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/the-end-of-us-bulk-telephony-collection-and-the-lessons-for-canada/article24948261/
[JURIST] The Constitutional Court of Belgium [official website] on Thursday ruled [judgment, PDF, in French] that a law requiring Internet service providers and telecommunications operators to retain customer metadata for possible future police investigations violates fundamental privacy rights and is therefore unconstitutional. Specifically the law required these organizations to store customer metadata [IDG report] such as phone call logs and Internet data for one year so that law enforcement could use the data for investigating serious crimes and terrorism. The law was enacted in 2013 as part of the EU Data Retention Directive [official website], which was invalidated [JURIST report] last year. The lawsuit was brought by the League of Human Rights [official website] and the Order of French-speaking and German-speaking Lawyers nearly immediately after the law was introduced.
Read more @ http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/06/belgium-court-rules-metadata-retention-law-unconsitutional.php
Should judges rather than ministers sign interception warrants? David Anderson’s review of investigatory powers legislation is a weighty and impressive piece of work. The QC’s 373-page report, published last Thursday, covers the activities of 600 public bodies that have powers to obtain information under 65 different statutory mechanisms. And he provides some telling insights into the work of the security and intelligence agencies. ‘They attempt to overcome encryption and its impact on traditional methods of interception by attacking it with powerful computers, by hacking individuals’ electronic devices, by modifying software and by guile, innovation and creativity,’ Anderson tells us. MI5, MI6 and GCHQ ‘seek to influence their targets’ behaviour by making themselves seem omnipotent or – at other times – weak’. For lawyers, though, two issues stand out. First, is it possible to compress these 65 statutory powers into a single act of parliament that is both comprehensive and comprehensible? It is easy enough to draft legislation as obscure as section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984, which allows the secretary of state to give a communications company ‘such directions… as appear… necessary in the interests of national security’. It is much harder to specify what sort of interception is to be allowed without tipping off a potential target. Second, who should sign the warrants that authorise the interception of communications? Should it continue to be a politician? Or should it be a judge? Although a warrant is needed before the police or agencies can read the contents of a message, lower levels of authorisation are sufficient for access to what’s called communications data — information relating to a message. That made more sense when the contents of a letter were more revealing than anything on the envelope. But, as Anderson confirms, what the Americans call metadata can prove hugely valuable – and he is right to say that higher levels of authorisation should be required for novel or contentious requests and those involving journalists or lawyers. Warrants are currently signed personally by a secretary of state – usually, the home secretary – under section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or section 49 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006. They may be targeted at a person or premises. They may also be thematic – because ‘person’ includes ‘organisation’. And they may gather large amounts of information entering or leaving Britain in bulk – because ‘external’ communications can be intercepted without the need to specify individual targets. Last year, Theresa May personally authorised 2,345 interception and property warrants, sometimes in the middle of the night. Anderson doubts whether this is the best use of her time, which is a polite way of questioning whether she relies too heavily on the advice of officials. But that is not the main reason Anderson thinks we should overhaul a system that dates back to the 17th century, if not earlier. He believes that a comprehensive system of judicial authorisation and oversight would improve public confidence.
Should judges rather than ministers sign interception warrants?
David Anderson’s review of investigatory powers legislation is a weighty and impressive piece of work.
The QC’s 373-page report, published last Thursday, covers the activities of 600 public bodies that have powers to obtain information under 65 different statutory mechanisms. And he provides some telling insights into the work of the security and intelligence agencies. ‘They attempt to overcome encryption and its impact on traditional methods of interception by attacking it with powerful computers, by hacking individuals’ electronic devices, by modifying software and by guile, innovation and creativity,’
Anderson tells us. MI5, MI6 and GCHQ ‘seek to influence their targets’ behaviour by making themselves seem omnipotent or – at other times – weak’.
For lawyers, though, two issues stand out. First, is it possible to compress these 65 statutory powers into a single act of parliament that is both comprehensive and comprehensible? It is easy enough to draft legislation as obscure as section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984, which allows the secretary of state to give a communications company ‘such directions… as appear… necessary in the interests of national security’. It is much harder to specify what sort of interception is to be allowed without tipping off a potential target.
Second, who should sign the warrants that authorise the interception of communications? Should it continue to be a politician? Or should it be a judge?
Although a warrant is needed before the police or agencies can read the contents of a message, lower levels of authorisation are sufficient for access to what’s called communications data — information relating to a message. That made more sense when the contents of a letter were more revealing than anything on the envelope. But, as Anderson confirms, what the Americans call metadata can prove hugely valuable – and he is right to say that higher levels of authorisation should be required for novel or contentious requests and those involving journalists or lawyers.
Warrants are currently signed personally by a secretary of state – usually, the home secretary – under section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or section 49 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006. They may be targeted at a person or premises. They may also be thematic – because ‘person’ includes ‘organisation’. And they may gather large amounts of information entering or leaving Britain in bulk – because ‘external’ communications can be intercepted without the need to specify individual targets.
Last year, Theresa May personally authorised 2,345 interception and property warrants, sometimes in the middle of the night. Anderson doubts whether this is the best use of her time, which is a polite way of questioning whether she relies too heavily on the advice of officials.
But that is not the main reason Anderson thinks we should overhaul a system that dates back to the 17th century, if not earlier. He believes that a comprehensive system of judicial authorisation and oversight would improve public confidence.
Read more @ http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/comment-and-opinion/spooks-under-surveillance/5049348.article
But claims bulk collection of online data is justified The legal framework justifying mass surveillance by UK intelligence agencies needs to be scrapped, according to an independent report commissioned by the UK government. The 373-page document titled "A Question of Trust" defends the controversial bulk collection of online data, but argues that the power to authorize individual surveillance warrants should be transferred from politicians to judges. "The current law is fragmented, obscure, under constant challenge and variable in the protections that it affords the innocent," said David Anderson, the lead author of the report. "It is time for a clean slate." Moving the powering to authorize individual warrants would, in theory, make it more difficult for intelligence agencies to carry out intrusive surveillance, but there's no guarantee that politicians will heed the report's recommendations. It also suggests that plans to revive the so-called Snoopers Charter — a controversial bill requiring ISPs to maintain records of users' internet history and messaging metadata for up to a year — should be shelved until there is actual evidence the law is needed. This is likely to irk the current Conservative government, which has been eager to push forward new surveillance laws.
But claims bulk collection of online data is justified
The legal framework justifying mass surveillance by UK intelligence agencies needs to be scrapped, according to an independent report commissioned by the UK government. The 373-page document titled "A Question of Trust" defends the controversial bulk collection of online data, but argues that the power to authorize individual surveillance warrants should be transferred from politicians to judges. "The current law is fragmented, obscure, under constant challenge and variable in the protections that it affords the innocent," said David Anderson, the lead author of the report. "It is time for a clean slate."
Moving the powering to authorize individual warrants would, in theory, make it more difficult for intelligence agencies to carry out intrusive surveillance, but there's no guarantee that politicians will heed the report's recommendations. It also suggests that plans to revive the so-called Snoopers Charter — a controversial bill requiring ISPs to maintain records of users' internet history and messaging metadata for up to a year — should be shelved until there is actual evidence the law is needed. This is likely to irk the current Conservative government, which has been eager to push forward new surveillance laws.
Read more @ http://www.theverge.com/2015/6/11/8764475/uk-mass-surveillance-independent-review
A new official report suggests the UK intelligence agencies should be allowed to keep mass spying activities including its metadata gathering powers. In a 373-page report published on Thursday, official reviewer of counter-terrorism laws has also proposed some changes saying the power to issue interception warrants should be transferred from ministers to judges.
A new official report suggests the UK intelligence agencies should be allowed to keep mass spying activities including its metadata gathering powers.
In a 373-page report published on Thursday, official reviewer of counter-terrorism laws has also proposed some changes saying the power to issue interception warrants should be transferred from ministers to judges.
Read more @ http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/06/11/415385/Let-UK-intel-agencies-do-mass-spying
Editor’s note: This is a chapter in Journalism After Snowden: The Future of Free Press in the Surveillance State, a forthcoming book from Columbia University Press. The book is part of the Journalism After Snowden initiative, a yearlong series of events and projects from the Tow Center for Digital Journalism in collaboration with CJR. The initiative is funded by The Tow Foundation and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. Journalism after Snowden? Two very big questions linger on—one about whether the very technologies Edward Snowden revealed are compatible with independent, inquiring reporting; and one crucial question about journalism itself, which could be boiled down to: “What is it supposed to be, or do?” The technologies first. Any journalist with even a cursory understanding of the Snowden stories published by The Guardian and The Washington Post would have come to an understanding that states—even liberal democracies—have the ability to intercept, store and analyse virtually all forms of electronic communication. Faceless people in shadowy agencies (not to mention the police) can, if they want, read your text messages and emails. They can see who or what you’ve been searching for. They can divine what you’re thinking. They can access all your contacts. And they can follow you. James Graham’s play, Privacy, at London’s Donmar Warehouse in 2014, dramatized some of these capabilities by exploiting some information the theatre-going audience had volunteered in the act of applying for tickets online, or by having their phones and wifi connections switched on during the performance. At one point in the first act members of the audience with iPhones were asked to go through a number of steps—flipping through Settings> Privacy > Location Services > System Services> Frequent Locations. Within a few seconds there was a collective gasp as half the stalls and circle occupants discovered the extent to which their phones had been tracking and storing their every moment. There was the evidence in front of their eyes: the maps showing the addresses they had visited over previous weeks or months, together with precise timings. The log of their lives.
Editor’s note: This is a chapter in Journalism After Snowden: The Future of Free Press in the Surveillance State, a forthcoming book from Columbia University Press. The book is part of the Journalism After Snowden initiative, a yearlong series of events and projects from the Tow Center for Digital Journalism in collaboration with CJR. The initiative is funded by The Tow Foundation and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation.
Journalism after Snowden? Two very big questions linger on—one about whether the very technologies Edward Snowden revealed are compatible with independent, inquiring reporting; and one crucial question about journalism itself, which could be boiled down to: “What is it supposed to be, or do?”
The technologies first. Any journalist with even a cursory understanding of the Snowden stories published by The Guardian and The Washington Post would have come to an understanding that states—even liberal democracies—have the ability to intercept, store and analyse virtually all forms of electronic communication. Faceless people in shadowy agencies (not to mention the police) can, if they want, read your text messages and emails. They can see who or what you’ve been searching for. They can divine what you’re thinking. They can access all your contacts. And they can follow you.
James Graham’s play, Privacy, at London’s Donmar Warehouse in 2014, dramatized some of these capabilities by exploiting some information the theatre-going audience had volunteered in the act of applying for tickets online, or by having their phones and wifi connections switched on during the performance.
At one point in the first act members of the audience with iPhones were asked to go through a number of steps—flipping through Settings> Privacy > Location Services > System Services> Frequent Locations. Within a few seconds there was a collective gasp as half the stalls and circle occupants discovered the extent to which their phones had been tracking and storing their every moment. There was the evidence in front of their eyes: the maps showing the addresses they had visited over previous weeks or months, together with precise timings. The log of their lives.
Read more @ http://www.cjr.org/opinion/edward_snowden_impact.php
E-tolls. Many, if not most, Gauteng residents hate them, even though the South African National Roads Agency has gone on a charm offensive to try and turn public opinion around. E-tolls. Many, if not most, Gauteng residents hate them, even though the South African National Roads Agency (Sanral) has gone on a charm offensive to try and turn public opinion around. In spite of mass opposition to electronic tolling in the province, the government has decided to continue with it, and to link payment to the renewal of motor vehicle licence disks to force compliance. The government’s decision followed an advisory panel report on the issue, which made a case for e-tolls to continue to provide funding for the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP), although it recommended reduced tariffs and alternative funding sources. The panel claimed to adopt a human rights approach to its work, which it said must be used to assess the impact of e-tolls in terms of ‘actual human experiences and relations’. However, its mandate was confined to the socio-economic impact of e-tolls. One human rights issue that remains unaddressed in the panel’s report is the impact of e-tolls on people’s right to locational privacy. Even e-toll detractors have hardly mentioned this issue, which is a major gap in public and media debates. Sanral tracks a vehicle’s locational information on tolled freeways, which they do by taking photographs of the vehicle registration plates as the vehicle drives under the gantries. Vehicles with e-tag transponders will communicate with the gantries via the transponders. Automated toll systems such as the one run by Sanral in Gauteng trigger particular privacy concerns because they involve the observation of specific vehicles in ways that allow the identity of the vehicle’s owner to be revealed. Although conceivably someone other than the owner could be driving the vehicle, ultimately the vehicle can be traced back to its owner.
E-tolls. Many, if not most, Gauteng residents hate them, even though the South African National Roads Agency has gone on a charm offensive to try and turn public opinion around.
E-tolls. Many, if not most, Gauteng residents hate them, even though the South African National Roads Agency (Sanral) has gone on a charm offensive to try and turn public opinion around.
In spite of mass opposition to electronic tolling in the province, the government has decided to continue with it, and to link payment to the renewal of motor vehicle licence disks to force compliance.
The government’s decision followed an advisory panel report on the issue, which made a case for e-tolls to continue to provide funding for the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP), although it recommended reduced tariffs and alternative funding sources.
The panel claimed to adopt a human rights approach to its work, which it said must be used to assess the impact of e-tolls in terms of ‘actual human experiences and relations’.
However, its mandate was confined to the socio-economic impact of e-tolls. One human rights issue that remains unaddressed in the panel’s report is the impact of e-tolls on people’s right to locational privacy.
Even e-toll detractors have hardly mentioned this issue, which is a major gap in public and media debates.
Sanral tracks a vehicle’s locational information on tolled freeways, which they do by taking photographs of the vehicle registration plates as the vehicle drives under the gantries.
Vehicles with e-tag transponders will communicate with the gantries via the transponders.
Automated toll systems such as the one run by Sanral in Gauteng trigger particular privacy concerns because they involve the observation of specific vehicles in ways that allow the identity of the vehicle’s owner to be revealed.
Although conceivably someone other than the owner could be driving the vehicle, ultimately the vehicle can be traced back to its owner.
Read more @ http://mybroadband.co.za/news/government/129110-the-government-can-spy-on-you-using-e-tolls.html
Last week, Republicans and Democrats in Congress joined President Barack Obama in congratulating themselves for taming the National Security Agency’s voracious appetite for spying. By permitting one section of the Patriot Act to expire and by replacing it with the USA Freedom Act, the federal government is taking credit for taming beasts of its own creation. In reality, nothing substantial has changed. Under the Patriot Act, the NSA had access to and possessed digital versions of the content of all telephone conversations, emails and text messages sent between and among all people in America since 2009. Under the USA Freedom Act, it has the same. The USA Freedom Act changes slightly the mechanisms for acquiring this bulk data, but it does not change the amount or nature of the data the NSA acquires. Under the Patriot Act, the NSA installed its computers in every main switching station of every telecom carrier and Internet service provider in the U.S. It did this by getting Congress to immunize the carriers and providers from liability for permitting the feds to snoop on their customers and by getting the Department of Justice to prosecute the only CEO of a carrier who had the courage to send the feds packing. In order to operate its computers at these facilities, the NSA placed its own computer analysts physically at those computers 24/7. It then went to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and asked for search warrants directing the telecoms and Internet service providers to make available to it all the identifying metadata -- the times, locations, durations, email addresses used and telephone numbers used -- for all callers and email users in a given ZIP code or area code or on a customer list.
Last week, Republicans and Democrats in Congress joined President Barack Obama in congratulating themselves for taming the National Security Agency’s voracious appetite for spying. By permitting one section of the Patriot Act to expire and by replacing it with the USA Freedom Act, the federal government is taking credit for taming beasts of its own creation.
In reality, nothing substantial has changed.
Under the Patriot Act, the NSA had access to and possessed digital versions of the content of all telephone conversations, emails and text messages sent between and among all people in America since 2009. Under the USA Freedom Act, it has the same. The USA Freedom Act changes slightly the mechanisms for acquiring this bulk data, but it does not change the amount or nature of the data the NSA acquires.
Under the Patriot Act, the NSA installed its computers in every main switching station of every telecom carrier and Internet service provider in the U.S. It did this by getting Congress to immunize the carriers and providers from liability for permitting the feds to snoop on their customers and by getting the Department of Justice to prosecute the only CEO of a carrier who had the courage to send the feds packing.
In order to operate its computers at these facilities, the NSA placed its own computer analysts physically at those computers 24/7. It then went to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and asked for search warrants directing the telecoms and Internet service providers to make available to it all the identifying metadata -- the times, locations, durations, email addresses used and telephone numbers used -- for all callers and email users in a given ZIP code or area code or on a customer list.
Read more @ http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/06/11/dont-be-fooled-america-your-government-is-still-lying-to.html
In April the junior senator from Kentucky announced that he was officially running for president. In May he released his new book, Taking a Stand, which argues that only a “new kind of Republican” can win a general election against Hillary Clinton, in part by embracing such cross-partisan issues as privacy, as he did most famously in a March 2013 filibuster about drone policy. And as the clock struck down to June, Paul fulfilled a campaign vow – and pissed off a lot of Republicans, including Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and much of the 2016 presidential field – by blocking reauthorization of the Patriot Act. Reason Magazine Editor-in-Chief Matt Welch sat down with Rand Paul in his Washington, D.C. campaign office Thursday to discuss his ongoing disputes with GOP hawks like Lindsey Graham, whether Edward Snowden should go to prison, and what will be the future of NSA surveillance. Runs approximately 14.30 minutes. Produced by Joshua Swain and Meredith Bragg. Scroll down for downloadable versions of this video, and subscribe to Reason TV's YouTube channel for daily content like this. This is a rush transcript. All quotes should be checked against the audio for accuracy. Reason: Senator Paul, thanks for joining us. Rand Paul: Glad to do it.
In April the junior senator from Kentucky announced that he was officially running for president. In May he released his new book, Taking a Stand, which argues that only a “new kind of Republican” can win a general election against Hillary Clinton, in part by embracing such cross-partisan issues as privacy, as he did most famously in a March 2013 filibuster about drone policy.
And as the clock struck down to June, Paul fulfilled a campaign vow – and pissed off a lot of Republicans, including Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and much of the 2016 presidential field – by blocking reauthorization of the Patriot Act.
Reason Magazine Editor-in-Chief Matt Welch sat down with Rand Paul in his Washington, D.C. campaign office Thursday to discuss his ongoing disputes with GOP hawks like Lindsey Graham, whether Edward Snowden should go to prison, and what will be the future of NSA surveillance.
Runs approximately 14.30 minutes.
Produced by Joshua Swain and Meredith Bragg.
Scroll down for downloadable versions of this video, and subscribe to Reason TV's YouTube channel for daily content like this.
This is a rush transcript. All quotes should be checked against the audio for accuracy.
Reason: Senator Paul, thanks for joining us.
Rand Paul: Glad to do it.
Read more @ http://reason.com/reasontv/2015/06/05/rand-paul-on-blocking-the-patriot-act-go
"What lies behind us and what lies before us are small matters compared to what lies within us." ~ Ralph Waldo Emerson ~
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